Part 1: What have the Syrians to gain from
an attack on Iran
Whether in
the stormy streets of Lebanon or behind the closed doors of the Mossad, words
and words again have been spilled on Iran’s nuclear program, and most
importantly on an imminent attack on Khomeini’s’ stronghold as a pre-emptive
option to avoid the emergence of a nuclear mushroom over Tel Aviv. The
controversy is fierce, and the implications are far reaching both regionally
and internationally. Taking the decision to fire a couple of Tomahawks over
Natanz facility or wiping out the Bushehr nuclear reactor is easy for some
officials in the Knesset, but the real nature of such decision is no different
than the ‘halted’ decision to fire nukes on Havana at the time of the Kennedy
administration in the 60s. Only difference: this time we don’t have brilliant
decision makers of Kennedy’s caliber.
In this
article, I will not spend chapters elaborating on the chaos an attack on Iran
would engender, but rather I wish to draw a positive picture of what everyone
has to gain from a military action against the Islamic Republic.
First focal
point I’ll build on is ultimately related to another tragedy ongoing right now,
a tragedy which victims amount to more than 10 000 and whose audience
overpassed the 6 billion viewers. Lots of troubles yet no one is making bald
moves, all what is being actively used are expired excuses copied from the
encyclopedia RealPolitika at the detriment of the civilians massacred in
AlHoula, Edlib and Dir Ezzour by the Assad mercenaries.
What have
we to gain from a potential attack on Iran in regards to the Syrian Crisis? An
individual with decent understanding of world alliances and regional features
of the Middle East can pinpoint to the answer: An inevitable fall of the regime
in Syria, and a long awaited victory of the Syrian revolution!
Well, what
if I’m not that knowledgeable in world politics and international relations;
could you enlighten me Mr. Belarbi on how an attack on Iran could speed up the
collapse of the Assad regime? Sure. A key ally to the regime in Syria is, as
most of us know, Iran whose unconditional support to the Allaouite center of
power made it possible for Assad to survive so far the revolution, along of
course with the strategic back up of Moscow and Beijing.
Teheran has
been indulging in tremendous efforts to secure logistical and military support
to the Syrian regime, let alone a fierce supply of advisors and defense strategists
summoned by the Ayatollah and either flown or put on the line with Assad
security chiefs and police. Giving lessons on ‘how to end dissidence and shut
down rebellion’ is nothing new for Teheran, and sharing this invaluable knowledge
with a key partner in the region is no more than a duty friends owe to each
other. This is far from being the product of speculations and hypothetical
scenarios as the UN and several western powers have condemned the shipping of
arms and weapons from Iran and Russia to Syria over the past months, weapons
which this time are not conventional missiles and rifles, but gear specially
used by police forces to storm demonstrations and fight dissidents and rebels.
This being
said, a potential military action in Iran could divert the Khomeini
administration from Syria, and instead give it enough troubles to focus solely
on the internal crisis and divert its entire logistical and military arsenal to
fight back the Zionist coordinated assault on the nation. The Assad regime deprived
from the flow of weapons coming from Persia, it will be impossible to sustain
the level of operations against the rebels, giving thus the revolution the
opportunity to revitalize across the country.
But Mr.
Belarbi, if the Syrian regime doesn’t get weapons from Iran, they could just as
well turn to someone else; they got a couple of friends ready to send in
supplies and ammunitions, don’t they?
Well
indeed, Syria has several key allies, but the business Syria does with Iran is different
in nature from the one it could conduct with Russia and China. Syria was not in
need of cash in order to receive weapons from Iran as the incentive of Khomeini
and Ahmadi Nejad was both sectarian and political, yet when it is business with
Moscow, the primary currency is money, not good will, and that’s something Bachar
Al Assad doesn’t have at the moment given the fact that the country doesn’t
have fountains of oil to lean on nor operating industries to finance its
purchases with. As Farid Zakaria repeated once and again, Assad is running out
of cash!
The other good
news for Syrian rebels in case an attack is undertook against Iran is that the
F-16 and drones used in an attack on Teheran could just as well gather
intelligence data on Assad troops and then send the intel to the rebels who
could operate more efficiently against the regimes’ squads. The air force
deployed against Iran nuclear facilities and the ground troops sent on the
ground if the conflict escalates will be of great resource to the
revolutionaries, both supplying them with weapons and with intelligence
reports. The story then would advance as it did in Libya: as the localisation of
Assad troops becomes easy, and as the Qatari weapons are supplied to the rebels
by the ground troops operating in Iran, the days of the Syrian regime would be
numbered, and the victory certain for the Syrian opposition. Voilà!Next: the beneficial implications on world crippled economy and on regional emerging power... Stay tuned!
To be continued...
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