What reforms needed for an AL Qaeda in decline Part 1

The survival of Al Qaeda is now as critical as ever, and the prospects of an eventual fortification of the network are fading each day with every single drone attack targeting its militants. The assassination of key leaders such as Ben Laden and Al Libi poses an existential threat to the fighters net due to the lack of guiding visionaries and strategists such as the aforementioned names. The terror group, which key militants drove the USSR out of Afghanistan and perpetrated the 9/11 attacks is now considered as an ephemeral threat to the United States and to the world as a whole, not only because of the low frequency attacks it masterminds, but also due to the decrease in Al Qaeda’s target profiles and attacks’ reach.

In such a matter of necessity to survive and re-emerge as a focal convergence for international security concerns, Al Qaeda has no choice but to redefine its strategies, armaments, targets and ideological input.  

Coming back to the source: the Arab Jihadists

It is necessary to look up the origins of any movement or group in order to understand its driving power, and ultimately its key weaknesses. The Al Qaeda network started as a paramilitary assembly driven by a strong religious imperative: Jihad.

The Arab mujahedeen, who gathered from places scattered throughout the Arab world to respond to the call of the Jihad and fly to the rescue of a fellow Islamic country have been the nucleus of what later came to be al Qaeda. With no intention to institutionalize the holy struggle or to prolong the fight outside the Afghani arena, the mujahedeen soon rose to an unprecedented success, glorified as national heroes and world militants against the communist tyranny. Falling prey to glory, the vision of  a timely fight upheld due to religious necessity became a philosophy of worldwide activism and international jihad, centralizing thus a religious precept into an ideological pool under the sole command of the soon to be Al Qaeda.

It is essential to remember that institutionalizing and idea, as I argued in my previous articles on the case of Kony 2012, leads ultimately to its demise, and in the case of Jihad, trying to contain all perpetrated acts against oppressing powers under the “patronage” of a single entity will expose the pristine concept to the fallacies of man-made establishment.

The first recommendation thus I issue to the network is the introduction of a paradigm shift in the working of the ideological preachers of Al Qaeda. Stressing the importance on Jihad rather than Al Qaeda the institution itself is necessary, and the creation of an illusion that Al Qaeda is not an employer in need of militants but rather a facilitator for volunteers to reach their goal of embarking in the holy voyage of Jihad. A clear distinction between Al Qaeda and Jihad ought to be implemented thoroughly in the wordings of messages, TV appearances and written material, this way, the mujahedeen eager on fighting against specific troops can easily approach the network with no regards to the establishment itself (with what that brings along of ideological and political disagreements), but with the sole interest of benefitting from the means and resources of the militant group.

The Arab mujahedeen who fled to the rescue of Afghanistan did so on the basis of a moral and religious compelling imperative, and as this fight was in the name of god, they believed in the righteousness of their struggle due to its non-attachment to any physical entity. Bridging an institution in the divine link between the mujahedeen and God is tantamount to the mistake committed by the Church which aspired to becoming the representative of God on Earth. Al Qaeda is no more than a conglomeration of people, drawing its force not from its divine status but from the achievements of its members. Failing to remain so is a clear exposition of the intention of the network to rush to its demise.


To be continued...
Part 2: The shift of targets