Showing posts with label War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label War. Show all posts

Sunday, April 28, 2013

When Chemical weapons and terrorist groups are better excuses


Syria's Chemical Weapons are a true "game changer" for international terrorism

The last few weeks have been generous in events and catastrophes, from the Boston bombings to the Iraqi bloodshed, from the attack in Libya against the French embassy to the Somali terror wave and the Iranian devastating earthquake, yet the landmark that has been highly overlooked and is of critical importance is the suspected use of chemical weapons in Syria.

The French, British and Israeli intelligence community were affirmative in proclaiming that Assad’s regime indeed had recourse to chemical weapons against the rebels, and the allegations were soon to be followed by several pictures of Syrian casualties presenting symptoms of chemical poisoning which the White House deemed possible yet not supported by clear and irrevocable evidences.

Deemed a “red line” not to be crossed and a “game changer” by Obama, the systematic use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime seems to be a victorious challenge to the current administration who cannot but push away the red line further, hoping that Assad would deign cross it and save the US another humiliating and embarrassing stance.

Yet…

As much as it seem that a potential intervention is unlikely giving the cautious rhetoric of Washington, the events on the ground suggest a wholly different approach. The US has witnessed the last week a convening of various Arab leaders who, by coincidence or design, have been scheduled in the oval office for private talks with the president at around the same time period. From the Emirati crown prince of Abu Dhabi to the leaders of Qatar and Jordan, the choice Obama made is highly strategic since these countries are the main regional players in the Syrian conflict, described by Fox News as “believed to be arming or training the rebel forces that are seeking to overthrow the Syrian government”[1] in a recent article tackling the meetings Obama held with the aforementioned leaders.
The timing of the meetings and the announcement of the usage of Chemical weapons by the Syrian government suggest a covert preparation for an imminent action in Syria. If the evidence about a determinate US plan to intervene military against Assad are blurry, the arguments for such action are not lacking with regards to US interests and national security imperatives.

The chemical weapons stockpiled in Syria are significant in numbers, to the extent that it is believed and assessed by various intelligence communities that “The Syrians have one of the largest chemical weapons arsenals in the world.”[2] Chemical weapons are the main source of alarm for the international community when it comes to the Syrian conflict, first because of the prevalent presence of Al Qaeda affiliates in the battle ground and their noted superiority in combat and organization, and second because of the ease of use and deployment of chemical weapons in terrorist incidents as in the 1995 subway Tokyo attacks.[3]

The Al Nusra rebel front, one of the most powerful factions battling Assad’s regime and by far its most radical, didn’t hide its allegiance to Al Qaeda as not only a small part of the network, but as significant enough to rush the Al Qaeda in Iraq into a merger with the Islamist jihadist cell. The merger was announced by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, head of the Islamic state in Iraq, who proclaimed: "We announce the abolition of the Islamic state of Iraq's name and Jabhat Al-Nusra's name and their amalgamation in one state under one name: The Islamic state in Iraq and the Levant."[4]

The news stirred a wide controversy regarding the armament of Syrian rebels, an armament pursued with eagerness by Qatar and Co who cannot wait to see Assad regime falling apart. Yet the issue of channeling the weapons to the right people is of little concern compared to the chemical weapons acquisition. The weapons delivered to the Syrian rebellion are of tactical use and have a low range of destruction, aimed primarily at inducing small-scale, targeted damage, while the chemical stockpile of the Syrian government contains primarily Sarin, a nerve gas agent that can spread over large areas and induce quick death through inhalation.[5] (The Tokyo subway attack stands witness to the deadly effect of Sarin that claimed the lives of 13 Japanese in 1995).

The ambitions of Al Nusra front, and of Al Qaeda de facto, to control and lay hand on chemical nerve agents is no news, yet how close the group is to attain such goal is alarming, and indeed helps explain the sense of urgency the intervention in Syria is prompting in the corridors of the White House.

In a recent article in the Telegraph, Colin Freeman writes:

The fight for al-Safira is no ordinary turf war, however, and the prize can be found behind the perimeter walls of the heavily-guarded military base on the edge of town. Inside what looks like a drab industrial estate is one of Syria's main facilities for producing chemical weapons - and among its products is sarin, the lethal nerve gas that the regime is now feared to be deploying in its bid to cling to power.[6]

The prospects of the Chemical weapons falling in the hands of extremist groups are recognized to be not only a domestic threat, but also a severe security breach for all regional actors including Israel and the Arab nations. Most probably the chemical weapons would be directed towards the spots where Al Qaeda is mostly present and where the odds for success are in the group’s favor. Iraq, with its weekly ever rising toll of deaths and attacks, would be the first country outside of Syria where the Sarin nerve agent would be deployed given the ability of the Al Qaeda operatives to smuggle the stockpiles into the wrecked country. Securing the chemical weapons is the priority of al Nusra front, and Syria as it stands now is not a safe haven to safeguard the precious prize. The need to move the chemical weapons to Iraq, if ever recovered by extremist cells, is apparent since the deployment of Sarin gas doesn’t need to be in large proportions. The rationing of the Chemical weapons into mobile portable loads carried by individuals for targeted locations is the modus operandi Al Qaeda would adopt given the restricted access it might have to the substance, and from then on the branching out of the chemical agent would take effect until tracking the initial containers becomes a futile intelligence efforts. The network of dormant cells Al Qaeda manages throughout the MENA region and beyond makes from the acquisition of nerve agent a true “game changer” in international terrorism.

Although many would recall the scandal of the “inexistent” Iraqi WMDs to refute the Chemical weapons excuse to intervene in Syria, the difference today is that we are faced with a situation where WMDs existence is not debated but held as a fact. The Syrian Chemical weapon stockpiles and the omnipresence of Al Qaeda affiliates in the battlefield is not debatable, and the recent battles ranging near military bases harboring nerve agents production and stockpiling facilities hint clearly to the possibility that a catastrophe situation might rise at any moment, a catastrophe where later containment is not an option.

Many have started calling for a more strategic approach towards supporting the Syrian rebellion, and it is now more than ever critical to adopt such a strategy if we are to avoid the unpleasant occurrence of a nerve agent attack in an Iraqi mall or a Lebanese public square.

Judging from the available mappings of Syrian chemical facilities, most installations trail along the western border with Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea. This geographical occurrence is of high strategic importance: The necessity to control these facilities is easier since most rebel secured areas lay on the western part of the country, and a potential intervention from regional or international corps launched from Lebanon and the Mediterranean shores will allow a quick takeover of the chemical plants to secure and systematically destroy the nerve agents. The establishments of no-fly zone partly over Syria, and specifically over the Western border will enable a constant monitoring of the facilities and an instantaneous response if hostile groups are seen entering the bases.

Moreover, the differing strength of Al Nusra group and the more liberal rebellious factions suggests that the commanders in chief of the free Syrian Army should redirect their efforts and progressions towards the Western border to help secure the stockpiles of chemical weapons, leaving the battle for Damascus and the most costly fights for Al Nusra faction in order to undermine the capabilities of the group and let it bear most casualties and damages in an effort to overtake it financially and logistically in the post-Assad Syria. The redeployment of the free Syrian army fully in the Western part of the country, leaving the Deir Ezor and eastern Aleppo area for the Al Nusra Group will help mildly separate the two rebellious groups and facilitate the directed armament and logistical provision to the Free Syrian army instead of blindly empowering both factions.

The Libyan downfall and the following dispersion of vast amounts of artillery in the region have had a direct effect on facilitating the Malian crisis emergence and AQMI rearmament. Today we are faced with an even more devastating type of weaponry in an area known for its high volatility. The consequences of Chemical weapons falling in the wrong hands will inevitably set new standards for terrorist activities, and will have far reaching impacts regionally and internationally. This is a “game changer” whose significance the US administration and the Arab governments understand very well, therefore the necessity for intervention has turned from a debate into a consensual agreement whose first signals were the series of meetings with Middle Eastern leaders in Washington, and whose ultimate ending will be a dramatic military action in Syria; the road to the final action is and remains convincing an ever skeptical public opinion, a conviction that seems all too well settling down after a tragic set of events that shook the public consciousness and laid a state of fear we have so many times encountered before major military implications in foreign countries.

Mohamed Amine Belarbi





[2] https://medium.com/today-in-syria/b9e9411a7429
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarin_gas_attack_on_the_Tokyo_subway
[4] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22078022
[5] http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/25/17917132-how-deadly-nerve-gas-sarin-kills?lite
[6] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10022753/Syria-Al-Qaedas-battle-for-control-of-Assads-chemical-weapons-plant.html

Tuesday, February 12, 2013

Malian Crisis: A golden chance for Algerian Geopolitics


With the situation in Mali progressing slowly towards a certain resolution that will be dictated by French military might, it becomes clear that what ought to be pondered is no longer the potential defeat or success of the intervention in Northern part of the country, but rather the future stakes that each regional and international player will bring back home. While French presence has been empowered more than ever by a loyal and grateful Malian government, Algeria on the other hand is still on the crossroads of defining its future role in Mali.

The Malian stability cannot in any way be guaranteed by a short term military intervention, and the French support of today may no longer be an option given the growing reluctance of the public opinion to afford another burden on the national economy, or to indulge in another armed conflict. The guarantor of Malian stability will with no doubt be Algeria, the regional player that has long been at the vanguard of anti terrorism in the Sahel region. With such responsibility comes a great deal of advantage, an advantage that Algiers knows well can be exploited to enhance its influence and reach not only in the Sahel, but also in the Sub-Saharan region all while accommodating French interests.


What the Malian crisis has shown is that the Malian military are far from being fully equipped to handle the challenges posed by domestic threats. The inability of the central government to provide security and stability throughout the vast territory accounts for a blatant lack of personnel and logistics among police forces and military troops. On the other hand, Algeria, the oil rich neighbor “most likely was the biggest military spender in Africa in 2009 and is the world’s ninth largest importer of weapons”. Moreover, Algeria’s military budget accounted this year for 10.3 Billion $ worth of equipment to modernize the military and boost security capabilities.[1]

Instead of letting French presence shape the regional politics and military agendas in Mali, Algeria is far more concerned with dictating terms on its borders through influencing its neighbor by the provisioning of support and military assistance. The French presence in Mali might seem like a much welcomed initiative, yet as the urgency of the security threats in Mali fades down, the French troops and intrusion will turn into a target of criticism, speculation and even confrontation given the social, religious and political environment surrounding the region’s state of affairs.
In order to enforce its agenda on Malian soil, Algeria will have to distance Paris and Bamako, creating an ideological rift that will make future support of Bamako relevant to the absurd. The way to go about such maneuver is to play the imperialism card, both on a domestic level and on a regional one.


Algerian diplomacy ought to conduct extensive talks with Malian authorities in order to warn them from a potential attempt by Paris to set foot in the region for exploitation purposes. As Mali’s resources are being slowly tapped into, and as the revenue from gold mining reaches new records due to the financial setbacks in the EU economy, it becomes a plausible theory that French presence is motivated by resources agreements and predatory agendas, a theory Algerians know all too well how to shape given the years of antagonistic politics they engaged Paris in.
The currency French authorities have on the table is military coverage and security provision, a currency quite affordable in Algerian soil. Thus, using a regional security umbrella pioneered by Algerian troops will uproot any need for French presence. Algeria has multiple incentives to engage in such scheme, from geopolitical ambitions for expansion and influence, to security advantages since it will have the ability to go after AQMI deep in Sahel soil.

On another note, Algeria has all to win from establishing itself fiercely in the Sahel due to the increasing popularity of Touareg dissidences. Given the precarious nature of ethnical distribution in Algeria, it is all too probable that revolts and proclaimed partial independence in the Sahel might fuel similar ambitions in Algeria, a prospect that the central government in Algiers has been combatting for decades now. A greater presence in the Sahel using Mali as a springboard will allow greater monitoring of rebellious movements and quicker responses to crisis before they extend to proportions that are threatening Algerian national security in its military and social aspects.

Finally, establishing itself as the primary player in the Sahel, Algeria gains de facto the role of the point contact in any initiatives including western interaction with the Sahel and Sub Saharan Africa. This gives any nation great leverage in shaping and dictating terms on the table of negotiations, in influencing the flow of trade and natural resources exploitation and in gaining benefits from future economic incursions by the US, EU or China in the rich mineral market of the Sahel.




[1] Algeria Increasing Military Spending, Defence Web, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28518&Itemid=118

Monday, January 21, 2013

Intervention in Mali: Between necessity and exploitation (Part 1)


In order to offer our readers an insight on the current crisis originating in Mali, we are launching a 2 parts essay analysis that will help clarify the underlying motives for the Tuareg revolution in Mali, Al-Qaeda's influence in the region and the role of the international players in sculpting the outcome of the conflict.

The first essay, titled "THE INTRICACIES OF A MALIAN ‘AZAWADSTAN’ ;  A RALLYING CALL FOR IMMIDIATE INTERVENTION", is a guest post by Samson Faboye from Nigeria.

The second essay, by Mohamed Amine Belarbi, will focus on the opportunities the crisis in Mali offers for regional and international players, as well as the way they ought to be exploited.

THE INTRICASIES OF A MALIAN ‘AZAWADSTAN’ ;  A RALLYING CALL FOR IMMIDIATE INTERVENTION

"Everyone knew this situation was coming; everyone knew that AQIM was present in the region; everyone knew that the Tuareg rebellion from 2008 in Mali had not been decapitated. And yet the Malians did not act."....... Bazoum Mohammed, Niger's foreign minister.    

The situation in Northern Mali, where a rebellion by Tuaregs and Islamic Militants declaring a ‘liberated Azawad’  in the North of Mali and then pushing to the  government controlled South, has alarmed the international community, particularly France. From the dust raised in the recent clash between the Malian Military and extremist Islamic Militant groups; top of which is theAnsar Dine and Mujao’ , both are thought be part of an extensive network of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)- though having different ideologies as against the Tuareg rebels of Northern Mali,  the rebellious forces united for a cause---‘shaking off Northern Mali or Azawad from Malian control’.

The vast arid North of Mali (an area the size of France) is covered by the Sahara and is populated by the Tuaregs (a normadic people who live in Mali, Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger). Seen as light skinned (though they are called the ‘blue people’) they’ve complained of marginalization in their respective countries of residence. As such the Tuaregs have fought several rebellious wars against the government of Niger, Algeria and Mali.

Despite the separatist intrigues of the Tuaregs in the Sahara, their rebellions have been quelled by force and negotiations over the years by respective governments they rebelled against. However, a statement made by the foreign minister of Niger at the recent Bamako summit in October 2012 hosted to resolve the Malian crises, shows that all is not well with Mali, especially the city that hosts tomb of 333 saints (Timbuktu)! And even her neighbours are alarmed by this dawning gruelling fact.

The rebel held Azawad or Northern Mali is already at a phase of derelict lawlessness and there are fears that it may become Africa’s Afghanistan or Pakistan’s Swat valley…hence the name ‘Azawadstan’!

Among the issues calling for action in Northern Mali are:

*    The clash between Tuareg separatist rebels  (MNLA) and Islamist militants. Though having variant ideologies, these groups united to kick out the Malian army from Azawad.
*    The destruction of ‘mausoleums’ and tombs of Islamic scholars in Timbuktu—regarded as a world heritage site by the UN.
*    The unhindered operation of Islamic militant groups especially (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) who are turning Northern Mali to a base or training facility for launching attacks in neighbouring states.
*    Most concerned is the Nigerien government, who fear that the Malian instability might just precipitate in their country and serve a distillery for instability in the West African Sub-region.
*    The recent capture of Diabaly and the attack on Konna by the Islamist militants, thus puting Bamako (the Malian capital) and the remaining government controlled areas at risk of being united under one ‘Azawadstan’


Intriguingly, the Malian crises does have some foriegn undertones. It is believed to be heightened by the influx of Tuareg fighters from Libya who fought on the side of the defeated Gaddafi loyalist forces during the 2011 Libyan revolution. Surely, the Libyan conflict did not end cheap. With proliferation of weapons during the conflict, it must have added to the lethal force of the Tuareg and Islamic separatist forces.

With hard lessons still being learnt from the Pakistani and Afghanistan situation, there’s a concern for the Malian case not to fall in that line.

There have been calls for an Ecowas military intervention force to liberate Northern Mali as any attempt to allow for an ‘Azawadstan’ may spark Tuareg separatist conflicts in other neighbouring countries and most the most chilling terrorist attacks in the West African subregion and even Europe!. Bearing in mind that Al-Queda linked groups hold sway in the territory, there’s an onus to restore sanity to the rebellious territory.

The Malian North which is a vast expanse of Sahara may not be familiar territory for any Ecowas intervention force. Moreover, there will be need for logistical air support from western powers—a cause which France is spearheading. With the Islamist militants now pushing towards Bamako, the French President has acceded to demands by the Malian Prime minister for help in the face of the ignominious defeat suffered by the Malian army in the hands of the rebels. The swift response of the French has thus encouraged a mobilization of WestAfrican forces to counter the activities of the Malian Islamists.
With the international scene wary of foreign intervention in crises ridden countries, whilst consention cannot be agreed on Syria, the world cannot afford to watch a helpless and hopeless Malian regime turn an Azawadstan!

Samson Faboye